A conceptual model for FRAND royalty setting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.03.005zbMATH Open1520.91206OpenAlexW4362634350MaRDI QIDQ6173755FDOQ6173755

Authors: Jens Leth Hougaard, Chiu Yu Ko, Xuyao Zhang 

Publication date: 13 July 2023

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.03.005

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuepatentstandard settingfair royaltiesFRAND-licensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• An Introduction to Allocation Rules
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Sharing the cost of redundant items
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem

Cited In (1)

• Systemic approach to innovations - standards vs software

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