A conceptual model for FRAND royalty setting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.03.005MaRDI QIDQ6173755zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jens Leth Hougaard, Chiu Yu Ko, Xuyao Zhang

Publication date 13 July 2023

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuepatentstandard settingfair royaltiesFRAND-licensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: general results
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Estimation of patent licensing value using a flexible demand specification
• Fee versus royalty reconsidered
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• An Introduction to Allocation Rules
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Sharing the cost of redundant items
• Uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem

Cited in

(1)

• Systemic approach to innovations - standards vs software

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