The calculation and simulation of the price of anarchy for network formation games

DOI10.1007/S11067-023-09588-XarXiv1108.4115OpenAlexW2205438496MaRDI QIDQ6195268

Terry L. Friesz, Christopher Griffin, Shaun Lichter

Publication date: 13 March 2024

Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4115

zbMATH Keywords

integer programmingequilibriumnetwork formationprice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Graph theory (05Cxx)

Cites Work

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