The power of the largest player

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.04.034MaRDI QIDQ1787621zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sascha Kurz

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04625

zbMATH Keywords

weighted gamespower measurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This paper analyzes how power indices differ with respect to the largest possible power of a non-dictatorial player. It turns out that the considered set of power indices can be partitioned into two classes. This may serve as another indication which index to use in a given application.

Recommendations

• Indices of criticality in simple games
• Indices of Criticality in Simple Games
• Some surprising properties of power indices.
• A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games
• Power indices of players in systems with weighted voting

Cites work

• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• On the inverse power index problem
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The inverse Banzhaf problem
• The inverse problem for power distributions in committees

This page was built for publication: The power of the largest player

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1787621)