Limit properties of power indices in a class of representative systems

DOI10.1007/BF01358799MaRDI QIDQ1824577zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shigeo Muto

Publication date 1989

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01358799

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf indicesfair representationlimit propertiespolitical economicsrepresentative systemsShapley-Shubik index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
• Voting power and proportional representation of voters
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
• The inverse problem for power distributions in committees

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limit theorems for sampling from finite populations
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Measure-Based Values of Market Games
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters
• The Partition Value
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

Cited in

(5)

• The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
• Voting power and at-large representation.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 14644 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters

This page was built for publication: Limit properties of power indices in a class of representative systems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1824577)