Reduced games and egalitarian solutions

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0504-8zbMath1388.91028OpenAlexW1752375015MaRDI QIDQ524980

Francesc Llerena, Llúcia Mauri

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0504-8

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gamelexmax solutionreduced games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Consistency of the equal split-off set, Monotonicity and egalitarianism

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Constrained egalitarian allocations
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• Neighbor games and the leximax solution
• Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games.
• Reduced game and converse consistency
• Cores of convex games
• Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games
• Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
• The equal split-off set for cooperative games
• The kernel of a cooperative game