Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems

DOI10.1111/IJET.12101MaRDI QIDQ4584825zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez Rodríguez

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12101

zbMATH Keywords

airport problemallocation rulemonotonicity axiomranking of rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem

Cited in

(10)

• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Considerations on the aggregate monotonicity of the nucleolus and the core-center
• For the airplane refueling problem local precedence implies global precedence
• Airport games: the core and its center
• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• The average-of-awards rule for claims problems
• Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game

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