Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1050.0502MaRDI QIDQ3115975zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William S. Lovejoy

Publication date 21 February 2012

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/35845

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designprincipal-agent nonlinear pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
• Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
• Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
• Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents
• Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1882040 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information sharing through digitalisation in decentralised supply chains
• Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
• Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
• Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency

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