Coarse Matching

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00361MaRDI QIDQ5475016zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Preston McAfee

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00361

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Cited in

(22)

• To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
• Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Synchronized matching with incomplete information
• Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
• Dress to impress: brands as status symbols
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• Matching through position auctions
• Nonlinear pricing with finite information
• Communication and efficiency in auctions
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions
• The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms
• Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
• Generalized coarse matching
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• All-pay matching contests
• Disclosure services and welfare gains in matching markets for indivisible assets
• Pareto improvements in the contest for college admissions
• Price discrimination and efficient matching

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