All-pay matching contests

DOI10.1007/S00182-022-00831-2MaRDI QIDQ6168263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aner Sela

Publication date 10 July 2023

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00831-2

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingall-pay contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• All-Pay Contests
• Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
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• Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
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Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options
• An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information
• Coarse Matching
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Contest architecture
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments
• The nature of tournaments
• The pre-marital investment game
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.

Cited in

(2)

• Tullock contests reward information advantages
• The assortative matching scheme in a survival battle

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