Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/s10472-005-4687-8zbMath1123.91313MaRDI QIDQ812381

Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari

Publication date: 23 January 2006

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4687-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; incentive compatibility; iterative auctions; combinatorial auctions; e-procurement; e-selling; generalized Vickrey auctions; weighted set covering problem; weighted set packing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C90: Applications of mathematical programming

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A46: Combinatorial games

Related Items

Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions, Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

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