Metrizable preferences over preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01235-0MaRDI QIDQ2217354zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Gilbert Laffond, M. Remzi Sanver, Lainé, Jean

Publication date 29 December 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01235-0

zbMATH Keywords

neutralityhyper-preferenceKemeny extension rulemetrizable extension rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

• Preferences and metric structures of spaces of alternatives
• A metric procedure for cardinal preferences
• Preference, topology and measure
• Measurement and preference function modelling
• Preference Assessment by Imprecise Ratio Statements
• Preference modelling, a matter of degree
• Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
• Parametric representation of preferences
• Euclidean preferences
• Characterizing Paretian preferences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650616 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3521740 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3191619 (Why is no real title available?)
• A re-characterization of the Kemeny distance
• A test of concordance based on Gini's mean difference
• Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Concordance between two linear orders: The Spearman and Kendall coefficients revisited
• Hyper-stable social welfare functions
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Monotone strategyproofness
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the comparison of the Spearman and Kendall metrics between linear orders.
• Ordinal Ranking with Intensity of Preference
• Preference structures I: Distances between transitive preference relations†
• Priority Ranking and Consensus Formation
• Priority Ranking and Consensus Formation: The Case of Ties
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
• Weighted distances between preferences

Cited in

(1)

• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

This page was built for publication: Metrizable preferences over preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2217354)