A dynamic model of a decision making body where the power of veto can be invoked

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_7MaRDI QIDQ4687463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacek Mercik, David Mark Ramsey

Publication date 11 October 2018

Published in Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_7

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationdynamic voting gameequilibriumpower of veto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1243371 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Power-law distributions in empirical data

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