A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.10.004MaRDI QIDQ2345218zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2sf6r7p5

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitybehavioral modelextensive-form gamedynamic interactive beliefsgeneralized backward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• On rationalizability in extensive games
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• On the centipede game
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
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• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
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Cited in

(9)

• Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Choice-driven counterfactuals
• Boundedly rational backward induction
• A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
• Rational play in extensive-form games
• Do individuals use backward induction in dynamic optimization problems? An experimental investigation

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