An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games (Q863184)

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell's Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob's assumption is wrong. (The notion of assumption is similar to the notions of `all and only' [\textit{I. L. Humberstone}, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 28, 177--188 (1987; Zbl 0636.03008)], `only knowing' [\textit{H. J. Levesque}, Artif. Intell. 42, 263--309 (1990; Zbl 0724.03019)] and `information' [\textit{G.Bonanno}, Synthese 147, 193--228 (2005; Zbl 1085.03012)].) It is shown that any belief model of a certain kind must have a 'hole'. An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst's tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.