Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection

DOI10.3982/ECTA13434MaRDI QIDQ4612490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eduardo M. Azevedo, Daniel Gottlieb

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13434

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioncontract theorygeneral equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
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• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
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• Matching markets with adverse selection
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• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
• On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets

Cited in

(16)

• Experts against adverse selection: A note on the existence of equilibrium with costly appropriable information
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost
• An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection
• An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
• On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
• Competing bandits: learning under competition
• Adverse selection, segmented markets, and the role of monetary policy
• REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
• Labour market screening and the design of social insurance: an equilibrium analysis of the labour market for the disabled
• Perfectly competitive markets as the limits of Cournot markets
• Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?

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