Competing bandits: learning under competition
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Cites work
- Action elimination and stopping conditions for the multi-armed bandit and reinforcement learning problems
- Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules
- Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms
- Contextual bandits with similarity information
- Dueling algorithms
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Learning and incentives in user-generated content: multi-armed bandits with endogenous arms
- Multi-armed bandit allocation indices. With a foreword by Peter Whittle.
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection
- Probability and Computing
- Product design in selection markets
- Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problems
- Strategic Experimentation
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem
- The \(K\)-armed dueling bandits problem
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Cited in
(6)- Coopetition against an Amazon
- Coopetition Against an Amazon
- Learning and incentives in user-generated content: multi-armed bandits with endogenous arms
- Learning Theory
- Learning equilibria in matching markets with bandit feedback
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626726 (Why is no real title available?)
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