Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01212494MaRDI QIDQ1896687zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marcel Boyer, Jean-Jacques Laffont, P. Mahenc, Michel Moreaux

Publication date 18 February 1996

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212494

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information in location theorymonotonic signaling gameprice competition stagesequential location stage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

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Cites work

• Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(3)

• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
• Sequential competitive location on networks
• Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

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