Signalling with Many Signals

DOI10.2307/1913605MaRDI QIDQ3753746zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maxim Engers

Publication date 1987

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913605

zbMATH Keywords

informational equilibriummarket with asymmetric informationscreeningsignalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

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Cited in

(30)

• Multidimensional signalling
• Upper semi-continuity of the separating equilibrium correspondence
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• When are signals complements or substitutes?
• Partially informative signaling
• Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions
• Signalling, information and consumer fraud
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Signaling theory revisited: a very short insurance case
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Signaling in Credit Markets
• Market signaling with grades
• Signaling private choices
• IPO activity and information in secondary market prices
• Signalling Reversal
• Technical note: Signaling product quality through a trial period
• Signalling to Experts
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• KRIEGSMARINE SIGNAL INDICATORS
• Signalling in an international Cournot model
• Pervasive signaling
• The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs
• Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
• Interpreted and generated signals
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

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