Signaling through Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.08.002MaRDI QIDQ7029981zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jonas Hedlund

Publication date 10 February 2025

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation transmissionsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• A Note on the Influence of the Sample on the Posterior Distribution
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Constrained Information Design
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Convex Analysis
• Costly miscalibration
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Extreme points of convex sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Market signaling with grades
• Misinformation
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Partially informative signaling
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling with Many Signals
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

This page was built for publication: Signaling through Bayesian persuasion

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7029981)