Misinformation

DOI10.1111/J.1468-2354.2012.00732.XMaRDI QIDQ4620070zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hao Li, Wei Li

Publication date 7 February 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00732.x

zbMATH Keywords

candidate for political officepositive (negative) campaignpublic signalvoter's belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• The war of information
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Cited in

(15)

• On the value of persuasion by experts
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Electoral competition with strategic disclosure
• Bad government can be good politics: political reputation, negative campaigning, and strategic shirking
• Market signaling with grades
• Information and Inaccuracy
• The war of information
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Propaganda and credulity
• Misinformation due to asymmetric information sharing
• A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
• Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game
• Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

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