Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0479-5zbMath1388.91038OpenAlexW412997902MaRDI QIDQ328568

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date: 20 October 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0479-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminfinite gamesapproximate equilibriumsymmetric games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items

A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players, Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games

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