Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

DOI10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421zbMath0864.90133OpenAlexW2155281098WikidataQ36697693 ScholiaQ36697693MaRDI QIDQ5689334

Kevin A. McCabe, Vernon L. Smith, Stephen J. Rassenti

Publication date: 6 January 1997

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421

zbMATH Keywords

decision makingsignalingreciprocitybackward inductiontwo-person extensive form game trees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

How to identify trust and reciprocity. ⋮ Generation of multicavity maps with different behaviours and its DSP implementation

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history

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