ON THE EXISTENCE OF BERGE'S STRONG EQUILIBRIUM

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003027zbMATH Open1259.91008MaRDI QIDQ3166239FDOQ3166239

Messaoud Deghdak, Monique Florenzano

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

continuityequilibriumessential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Essential equilibria of \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium. A note on the 'new' existence theorems
• The fixed point theory of multi-valued mappings in topological vector spaces
• Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria
• Berge equilibrium: some recent results from fixed-point theorems
• Sur l'équilibre fort selon Berge

Cited In (4)

• Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria.
• Sur l'équilibre fort selon Berge
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• ON A GENERALIZED BERGE STRONG EQUILIBRIUM

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