The dynamics of collective action

DOI10.1007/BF01298496zbMath0827.90049arXivchao-dyn/9307016OpenAlexW2071886506MaRDI QIDQ1891390

Bernardo A. Huberman, Natalie S. Glance

Publication date: 30 May 1995

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/chao-dyn/9307016

zbMATH Keywords

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Group preferences (91B10) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (1)

Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The Public Goods game

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The sciences of the artificial
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Persistence of nonoptimal strategies
• The outbreak of cooperation
• Unnamed Item

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