Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
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Publication:1378025
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0584zbMATH Open0891.90177OpenAlexW2020420004MaRDI QIDQ1378025FDOQ1378025
Authors: Mathijs Jansen, Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, Hans Peters
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/28635bbb34be14d65df984ac729b40df9471ec7b
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Bayesian and consistent assessments
- A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
- An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
- AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
- Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
- AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
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