Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0584zbMath0891.90177OpenAlexW2020420004MaRDI QIDQ1378025

Mathijs Jansen, Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/28635bbb34be14d65df984ac729b40df9471ec7b

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesalgebraic characterization of consistent assessments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties, Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games, Bayesian and consistent assessments, An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments, AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium, Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

Cites Work

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• Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The space of conditional systems is a ball
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium