Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
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Publication:1378025
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0584zbMath0891.90177OpenAlexW2020420004MaRDI QIDQ1378025
Mathijs Jansen, Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/28635bbb34be14d65df984ac729b40df9471ec7b
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