A PSEUDO "FOLK" THEOREM IN THE STRATEGIC PROVISION OF STOCK EXTERNALITIES

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001094zbMATH Open1121.91387MaRDI QIDQ4474573FDOQ4474573

Authors: Zili Yang 

Publication date: 12 July 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

\(\epsilon\)-Nash equilibriumOpen-loop Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentives in Teams
• A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race

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