Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90073-TzbMATH Open0747.90011OpenAlexW2087802835MaRDI QIDQ1189350FDOQ1189350

Authors: Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90073-t

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zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-person collective choice problembudget balancingefficient dominant strategy mechanismquasi-linear utility functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentives in Teams
• On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information

Cited In (2)

• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information

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