Evolutionary dynamics of gig economy labor strategies under technology, policy and market influence

DOI10.3390/G12020049MaRDI QIDQ2052553zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Kevin Hu, Feng Fu

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.13234

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary economicsevolutionary game theorygig workeroscillatory dynamicssocial learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Labor markets (91B39) Social learning (91D15)

Abstract: The emergence of the modern gig economy introduces a new set of employment considerations for firms and laborers that include various trade-offs. With a game-theoretical approach, we examine the influences of technology, policy and markets on firm and worker preferences for gig labor. Theoretically, we present a new extension to the replicator equation and model oscillating dynamics in two-player asymmetric bi-matrix games with time-evolving environments, introducing concepts of the attractor arc, trapping zone and escape. We demonstrate how changing market conditions result in distinct evolutionary patterns for gig-labor preferences across high and low skill work-forces, which we explain through their differing sensitivities to market-driven consumer demand and financial incentives among other considerations. Informing tensions regarding the future of this new employment category, we present a novel payoff framework to analyze the role of technology on the growth of the gig economy. Finally, we explore regulatory implications within the gig economy, demonstrating how intervals of lenient and strict policy alter firm and worker sensitivities between gig and employee labor strategies.

Review text

Summary: The emergence of the modern gig economy introduces a new set of employment considerations for firms and laborers that include various trade-offs. With a game-theoretical approach, we examine the influences of technology, policy and markets on firm and worker preferences for gig labor. Theoretically, we present new conceptual extensions to the replicator equation and model oscillating dynamics in two-player asymmetric bi-matrix games with time-evolving environments, introducing concepts of the attractor arc, trapping zone and escape. While canonical applications of evolutionary game theory focus on the evolutionary stable strategy, our model assumes that the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics and can persist for long temporal intervals in a pseudo-stable state. We demonstrate how changing market conditions result in distinct evolutionary patterns across labor economies. Informing tensions regarding the future of this new employment category, we present a novel payoff framework to analyze the role of technology on the growth of the gig economy. Regarding governance, we explore regulatory implications within the gig economy, demonstrating how intervals of lenient and strict policy alter firm and worker sensitivities between gig and employee labor strategies. Finally, we establish an aggregate economic framework to explain how technology, policy and market environments engage in an interlocking dance, a balancing act, to sustain the observable co-existence of gig and employee labor strategies.

Recommendations

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Cited in

(1)

• Characterizations of GIG laws: a survey

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