A differential game model of labor-management negotiation during a strike

DOI10.1007/BF00934939zbMATH Open0259.90065OpenAlexW4242698984MaRDI QIDQ2560100FDOQ2560100

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00934939

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Sufficiency theorems for optimal control
• Collective bargaining: A differential game
• Some Sufficiency Conditions for Pareto-Optimal Control
• Sufficient conditions for optimal control with state and control constraints
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (4)

• Discontinuous differential equations. II
• Nonzero-sum differential games (The noncooperative variant)
• Differential games with nonzero sum (cooperative variant)
• Evolutionary dynamics of gig economy labor strategies under technology, policy and market influence

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