Self-fulfilling expectations, history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment

DOI10.1007/BF01258620zbMATH Open0855.90041OpenAlexW2058243568MaRDI QIDQ1923977FDOQ1923977

Authors: Been-Lon Chen 

Publication date: 12 January 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01258620

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zbMATH Keywords

persistent unemploymentsearch equilibrium model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• The bargaining problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations
• Costly Search and Recruiting
• Stability of Equilibria with Externalities
• Security Equilibrium

Cited In (1)

• Market frictions, technology adoption and economic growth.

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