The High Unemployment Trap

DOI10.2307/2118449zbMATH Open0831.90042OpenAlexW1577121606MaRDI QIDQ4845453FDOQ4845453

Authors: Gilles Saint-Paul 

Publication date: 11 September 1995

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2118449

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zbMATH Keywords

labor marketmultiple equilibriafiring restrictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (3)

• Technological choices and unemployment benefits in a matching model with heterogeneous workers
• Precautionary demand for labour and firm size
• Hidden unemployment

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