The High Unemployment Trap

DOI10.2307/2118449MaRDI QIDQ4845453zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilles Saint-Paul

Publication date 11 September 1995

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2118449

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketmultiple equilibriafiring restrictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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