On optimal reinsurance treaties in cooperative game under heterogeneous beliefs
DOI10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2018.12.004zbMath1419.91372OpenAlexW2907768954MaRDI QIDQ1735045
Wenjun Jiang, Hanping Hong, Chen Yang, Jiandong Ren
Publication date: 28 March 2019
Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.12.004
expected utilitycooperative gameNash bargaining solutionheterogeneous beliefsKalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutionPareto-optimal reinsurance
Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (16)
Cites Work
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