Optimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of instability, greed and idealism

DOI10.1007/S00224-019-09958-4MaRDI QIDQ2195569zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors T.-H. Hubert Chan, Fei Chen, Li Ning

Publication date 26 August 2020

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09958-4

zbMATH Keywords

greed and idealismNash equilibriumnetwork bargaining gameoptimizing social welfareunstable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(3)

• Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
• Optimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of unstability, greed and spite
• Bargaining in networks with socially-aware agents

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