Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

DOI10.1007/S10203-021-00326-XMaRDI QIDQ2044827zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Guerrazzi

Publication date 10 August 2021

Published in Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-021-00326-x

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controllocal dynamicswage-employment bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Labor markets (91B39)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3079001 (Why is no real title available?)
• An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
• Bargaining solutions at work: qualitative differences in policy implications
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model

Cited in

(8)

• Hours and wages: a bargaining approach
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
• Union-firm bargaining: order of play and efficiency
• A dynamic model of collective bargaining
• Essays on wage bargaining in dynamic macroeconomics
• The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts
• A dynamic programming model for effect of worker's type on wage arrears
• Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations

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