Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model
DOI10.1007/S10203-021-00326-XzbMATH Open1470.91129OpenAlexW3044683767MaRDI QIDQ2044827FDOQ2044827
Authors: Marco Guerrazzi 
Publication date: 10 August 2021
Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-021-00326-x
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Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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- Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
- Bargaining solutions at work: qualitative differences in policy implications
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
- Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
- An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
Cited In (8)
- A dynamic model of collective bargaining
- The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts
- Essays on wage bargaining in dynamic macroeconomics
- A dynamic programming model for effect of worker's type on wage arrears
- Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
- Hours and wages: a bargaining approach
- Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations
- Union-firm bargaining: order of play and efficiency
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