POPPONENT: highly accurate, individually and socially efficient opponent preference model in bilateral multi issue negotiations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2084600
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3954298 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1179314 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2088172 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200689 (Why is no real title available?)
- Negotiating with bounded rational agents in environments with incomplete information using an automated agent
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The bargaining problem
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