Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF01227017zbMATH Open0729.90002OpenAlexW2046288082MaRDI QIDQ806650FDOQ806650

Authors: Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert 

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01227017

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zbMATH Keywords

status quoimpossibility theoremsbargaining mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution
• Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
• Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
• Distributive justice of bargaining and risk sensitivity

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