Bayesian comparative statics

DOI10.3982/TE4345zbMATH Open1489.91048OpenAlexW4206818537MaRDI QIDQ5087345FDOQ5087345

Authors: Teddy Mekonnen, René Leal-Vizcaíno 

Publication date: 11 July 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4345

Recommendations

• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
• Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

zbMATH Keywords

convex ordersupermodular stochastic orderpersuasion with many receievers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cited In (3)

• Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
• Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
• When are signals complements or substitutes?

This page was built for publication: Bayesian comparative statics

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5087345)