Bayesian comparative statics

DOI10.3982/TE4345zbMATH Open1489.91048OpenAlexW4206818537MaRDI QIDQ5087345FDOQ5087345

Authors Teddy Mekonnen, René Leal-Vizcaíno

Publication date 11 July 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4345

zbMATH Keywords

convex ordersupermodular stochastic orderpersuasion with many receievers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
• When are signals complements or substitutes?
• Comparing information in general monotone decision problems

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