Accounting for noise in the microfoundations of information aggregation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.004zbMath1393.91108OpenAlexW3124438630MaRDI QIDQ523031

Sera Linardi

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgenoisy communication protocolsinformation aggregationprediction markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

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• We can't disagree forever
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
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• Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes
• Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data
• Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling
• Self-Correcting Information Cascades

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