Achieving optimal adversarial accuracy for adversarial deep learning using Stackelberg games
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Publication:2080981
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Cites work
- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- Adversarial Risk via Optimal Transport and Optimal Couplings
- Game theory
- Game theory and machine learning for cyber security
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3228304 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiagent Systems
- On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
- Why do deep convolutional networks generalize so poorly to small image transformations?
Cited in
(8)- Optimal training for adversarial games
- Theoretical investigation of generalization bounds for adversarial learning of deep neural networks
- Dynamic Cheap Talk for Robust Adversarial Learning
- Adversarial models for priority‐based networks
- A Game Theoretic Perspective on Adversarial Machine Learning and Related Cybersecurity Applications
- A fast saddle-point dynamical system approach to robust deep learning
- When Should You Defend Your Classifier?
- Neural operators can play dynamic Stackelberg games
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