Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2108762
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.002zbMATH Open1503.91068OpenAlexW4297142651MaRDI QIDQ2108762FDOQ2108762
Authors: X. Henry Wang, Jingang Zhao 
Publication date: 20 December 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.09.002
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- The equilibria of a multiple objective game
- On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs
- An open problem on inverse matrices from industrial organization, and a partial solution
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: an economic alternative to market definition
- Why are firms sometimes unwilling to reduce costs?
- Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory
- There may be no pass through of a merger-related cost efficiency
- Globalization and multiproduct firms
Cited In (25)
- Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Complementing Cournot's analysis of complements: unidirectional complementarity and mergers
- The ABC of complementary products mergers
- Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: Mergers among parking lots.
- Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs
- ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MERGERS FOR MARKET POWER
- On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
- On the welfare impact of mergers of complements: raising rivals' costs versus elimination of double marginalization
- The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in oligopolistic industries
- Can consumer surplus decrease with merger efficiencies?
- Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects
- Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly and mergers
- Firm-specific cost savings and market power
- Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition
- A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot
- Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium
- Horizontal mergers in a differentiated Cournot oligopoly
- Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains
- Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects
- Competition in non-linear pricing, market concentration and mergers
- Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products
- On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
- Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: profitability and consumer welfare
- Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs
This page was built for publication: Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2108762)
