Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: profitability and consumer welfare

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.032MaRDI QIDQ500474zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chih-Chen Liu, Leonard F. S. Wang

Publication date 5 October 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.032

zbMATH Keywords

consumer welfarehorizontal mergerStackelberg competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets

Cited in

(9)

• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy
• Impacts of horizontal mergers on dual-channel supply chain
• Profitability of horizontal mergers in the presence of price stickiness
• Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
• Merger in a Stackelberg oligolopoly
• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets
• Dynamics of a quantum duopoly Stackelberg game model with marginal costs
• Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

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