Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: profitability and consumer welfare

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.032zbMATH Open1321.91075OpenAlexW1987032614MaRDI QIDQ500474FDOQ500474

Authors: Chih-Chen Liu, Leonard F. S. Wang 

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.032

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zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg competitionconsumer welfarehorizontal merger

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets

Cited In (9)

• Dynamics of a quantum duopoly Stackelberg game model with marginal costs
• Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs
• Profitability of horizontal mergers in the presence of price stickiness
• Merger in a Stackelberg oligolopoly
• Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy
• Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly
• On merger profitability in a Cournot setting
• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets
• Impacts of horizontal mergers on dual-channel supply chain

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