On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs

DOI10.1007/s00712-008-0046-7zbMath1164.91043OpenAlexW2041076284MaRDI QIDQ1028681

Jingang Zhao, X. Henry Wang

Publication date: 6 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0046-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (8)

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes ⋮ The superiority among specific, demand ad valorem and cost ad valorem subsidy regimes ⋮ Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct ⋮ Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations ⋮ An open problem on inverse matrices from industrial organization, and a partial solution ⋮ Commodity tax structure under uncertainty in a perfectly competitive market ⋮ Indirect taxation and undesirable competition ⋮ Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies

Cites Work

• A note on ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model
• The comparative efficiency of ad valorem and specific taxes under monopoly and monopsony
• The comparison between ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition

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