The superiority among specific, demand ad valorem and cost ad valorem subsidy regimes
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Publication:1652809
DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0542-8zbMATH Open1402.91474OpenAlexW2608142184MaRDI QIDQ1652809FDOQ1652809
Authors: Wen-Jung Liang, Kuang Cheng Andy Wang, Ping-Yao Chou
Publication date: 16 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0542-8
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Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Foreign penetration and domestic competition
- Indirect taxes in a cross-border shopping model: a monopolistic competition approach
- Detection and impact of industrial subsidies: the case of Chinese shipbuilding
- Commodity taxes and rent extraction
- Subsidies, spillovers and exports
- Preferences, welfare and desirable subsidies under monopolistic competition
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