The comparative efficiency of ad valorem and specific taxes under monopoly and monopsony
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Publication:1292465
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00018-XzbMATH Open0923.90048OpenAlexW1990337442WikidataQ127288695 ScholiaQ127288695MaRDI QIDQ1292465FDOQ1292465
Authors: Stephen F. Hamilton
Publication date: 21 June 1999
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00018-x
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- The superiority among specific, demand ad valorem and cost ad valorem subsidy regimes
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