Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition
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Publication:3161803
DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1563zbMath1197.91098OpenAlexW2766606561MaRDI QIDQ3161803
Joseph Farrell, Carl R. Shapiro
Publication date: 18 October 2010
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/35c5f846
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Multi-Product Price and Assortment Competition ⋮ Upward pricing pressure under capacity constraints, kinked demand and other cases of a constrained pre-merger equilibrium ⋮ LeChatelier-Samuelson principle in games and pass-through of shocks ⋮ Unilateral effects of mergers with general linear demand ⋮ A simple model of mergers and innovation ⋮ Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing ⋮ Indicative price rise with synergies ⋮ Privatization neutrality theorem in free entry markets ⋮ Critical efficiencies as upward pricing pressure with feedback effects ⋮ Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies
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