Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
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Publication:1698970
DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9595-yzbMath1395.91014OpenAlexW2537884641MaRDI QIDQ1698970
Luisa Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo, Amparo M. Mármol, Asunción Zapata
Publication date: 16 February 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://idus.us.es/handle/11441/67701
Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory (91B16) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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