Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0015MaRDI QIDQ2867527zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luke Hu

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13177/

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsindustrial organizationmechanism designprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Reserve price commitments in auctions

Cites work

• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
• Participation in auctions
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs

Cited in

(4)

• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Security bid auctions for agency contracts
• Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation

This page was built for publication: Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2867527)