Pages that link to "Item:Q2432505"
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The following pages link to Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505):
Displaying 17 items.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey (Q334204) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules (Q464615) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (Q532698) (← links)
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs (Q952695) (← links)
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions (Q976973) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (Q5053687) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)
