On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958)

From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
scientific article

    Statements

    On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    14 May 2008
    0 references
    The function of \(n\) that gives the number of lattice points in the dilation \(nP\) of a rational polytope \(P\) was studied by \textit{E. Ehrhart} [see for instance, Polynômes arithmétiques et méthode des polyedres en combinatoire. International Series of Numerical Mathematics. Vol. 35. Basel - Stuttgart: Birkhäuser Verlag. (1977; Zbl 0337.10019)], who proved that the function is given by a polynomial if \(P\) is a lattice polytope and a cyclically repeating list of polynomials in general. Since then, the Ehrhart polynomials have been studied by many researchers; for an exposition see [\textit{A. Barvinok}, ``Integer points in polyhedra,'' Zürich Lectures in Advanced Mathematics. Zürich: European Mathematical Society (EMS). (2008; Zbl 1154.52009)]. Such mathematical techniques are important in the theory of voting because voting profiles of particular types are naturally identified with lattice points in certain polytopes. In the paper under review the authors give a brief exposition of the Ehrhart theory and associated algorithms of Barvinok, Clauss and Loechner, and they observe that these ideas and techniques underlie recent work of \textit{H. C. Huang} and \textit{V. C. H. Chua} [Soc. Choice Welfare 17, No. 1, 143--155 (2000; Zbl 1069.91529)] and \textit{W. V. Gehrlein} [Soc. Choice Welfare 19, No. 3, 503--512 (2002; Zbl 1072.91530)]. To illustrate the usefulness of the Clauss and Barvinok algorithms, the authors use them to analyze voting profiles that exhibit three specific properties. In one of these analyses they show that for three-candidate elections with many voters, slightly more than half of the voting situations allow strategic manipulation of the Borda count by coalitions; this result confirms a prediction based on small examples given by \textit{P. Favardin} et al. [Rev. Econ. Des. 7, No. 2, 213--228 (2002; Zbl 1048.91040)].
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    Ehrhart polynomial
    0 references
    voting theory
    0 references
    polytope
    0 references
    algorithm
    0 references
    manipulability
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references