Pages that link to "Item:Q3683835"
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The following pages link to Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (Q3683835):
Displayed 50 items.
- Optimal reinsurance with multiple tranches (Q306745) (← links)
- Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders (Q337790) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
- Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard (Q522996) (← links)
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
- On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types (Q529764) (← links)
- On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium (Q532656) (← links)
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (Q617676) (← links)
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality (Q639892) (← links)
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (Q794886) (← links)
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms (Q804453) (← links)
- Efficient compromising (Q840684) (← links)
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (Q840688) (← links)
- The value of information for auctioneers (Q840693) (← links)
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction (Q878397) (← links)
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions (Q892845) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
- Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (Q938057) (← links)
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382) (← links)
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values (Q996390) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
- Aggregation of expert opinions (Q1007768) (← links)
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information (Q1099054) (← links)
- Value of communication in agencies (Q1119137) (← links)
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction (Q1181222) (← links)
- Pollution claim settlements under correlated information (Q1268595) (← links)
- Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview (Q1272628) (← links)
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments (Q1300508) (← links)
- Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (Q1338090) (← links)
- An optimal auction for complements (Q1357402) (← links)
- The effectiveness of English auctions. (Q1399514) (← links)
- Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. (Q1416504) (← links)
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. (Q1421886) (← links)
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. (Q1431786) (← links)
- Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems (Q1577932) (← links)
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (Q1616494) (← links)
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
- Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks (Q1654094) (← links)
- Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model (Q1693851) (← links)
- Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments (Q1712152) (← links)
- Voting with public information (Q1735780) (← links)
- Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions (Q1751766) (← links)
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents (Q1757591) (← links)
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms (Q1876661) (← links)
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design (Q1877157) (← links)
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types (Q1929446) (← links)